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B
Csaba Lentner 
A few historic and international
aspects of the Hungarian 
economic crisis and crisis
management
Because of the significant international embed-
dedness of the Hungarian economy formulated
over a period of two decades, the causes of the eco-
nomic crisis inflicted upon the country and the
potential methods of crisis management can exclu-
sively be assessed after an itemised examination of
the historical and international processes of inte-
gration in market economy. The study places a key
emphasis on the regulation of money markets and
accounting, which represents a formative influ-
ence on capital investments, lending processes in
banks and on consumer behaviour. Due to the fact
that the Hungarian economy and the system of
market mechanisms are considerably oriented
towards foreign markets, the potential solutions to
crisis management can only be successful if adapt-
ed from the major international trends.
The study mostly relies on the author's research
results, with special respect to his study tour taken to
Great Britain between 2007 and 2009 examining the
subject of the crisis in the secondary mortgage market.
THE ULTIMATE CAUSE OF THE HUNGARIAN
CRISIS LIES IN THE CONTRADICTIONS OF
TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY
The crisis generated by the British-American sec-
ondary mortgage markets found the Hungarian
economy devoid of efficient means of protection
and in a weakened condition, although the per-
manent integration in market economy going on
since 1987 was considered as exemplary, signs of
financial tension were observed at the turn of the
millennium. One reason for weakening is a lack of
sufficient internal capital accumulation and high
foreign capital dependence that temporarily com-
pensates for it, which at times of crisis entail a
decline in production at the level of the national
economy and emergence of budgetary, corporate
and bank liquidity problems. The other is that the
reform measures in the general government and the
related services sector have not been realised. The
corrective convergence programme of 2006
adopted in order to eliminate the significant
'sticky' general government deficit above 10 per
cent set the right course; however, in the fields of
correction, healthcare, higher education and
public administration reforms were aborted due
to the resistance of the Hungarian society. By the
time the economic crisis set in in 2008, which
grew international out of the British-American
secondary mortgage markets, the conditions of
efficient anti-crisis measures had not been cre-
ated in Hungary.
Knowing the current contradictory situation
of the Hungarian economic policy, it is crucial
to define and model the specific link of inte-
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gration that has evolved between Hungary and
the developed market economies in the past 20
years. Being one of the most successful Eastern
European states pursuing a planned economy,
Hungary definitively lost the potential of fur-
ther development by the late 1980s. After the
internal resources of the socialist system of
planned economy depleted, the foreign loans
borrowed in order to facilitate restructuring
were utilised unfavourably, and the standard of
living was artificially kept up, funded from
other than internal income generated, the
Hungarian economic policy – giving in to
social expectations – kept on seeking the possi-
bilities of economic growth and, on those
grounds, of raising the standard of living. It is
obvious for an economic policy that also seeks
to meet social expectations to prefer a social
medium that represents the least possible
resistance, and to strive for implementing the
objectives set as broadly and as fast as possible.
At the end of the 1980s, in the period of deple-
tion and then failure of the social and econom-
ic system of socialism, fast and spectacular
results were achievable through the investment
of capital arriving from the developed market
economies in search of good investment possi-
bilities, in a volume sufficient to dynamise the
conditions of the Hungarian economy – with a
view to avoiding full economic and social esca-
lation. The social aspect of this – particularly,
job creation and a chance of a more developed
industrial culture – was also anticipated to be
spectacular. Favourable to the need for fast
dynamisation of the Hungarian economy in the
late 1980s was the enforcement of an econom-
ic political environment seen across the global
economy, which facilitated more liberal and
easier capital investments, known as the
Washington Consensus. 
As of the late 1980s, the masses of working
capital investments flowing into Hungary, then
the portfolio capital investments aimed at
financing the general government were
favourably affected by the Hungarian regulato-
ry tax, finance and accounting environment,
sector-neutral handling of capital, which creat-
ed favourable conditions also in terms of con-
vertibility of capital and bilateral movements
(investments, profit repatriation) on both the
social and the investor side. A peculiar set of
relations developed among the Hungarian eco-
nomic policy, which was short of capital but
emphasised dynamic development objectives,
the Hungarian households, which preferred a
consumption level characteristic of the West,
and expected a consumers' paradise, as well as
the developed market economies or transna-
tional corporations, which – compared to the
Hungarian dimensions – were capable of
unlimited capital investment. On the one hand,
a continually growing level of needs, a pile of
expectations grew permanent on the recipient
side of the bilateral relationship of the Central
Eastern European system of post-planned
economy, which was seeking convergence with
the developed market economies (which shows
characteristics of economic and social semi-
periphery in a number of aspects) and the
Western European and North American
investors, while on the side of developed
economies, the constant abilities that facilitat-
ed transferring unlimited capital and developed
technologies were available. (See Chart 1) This
flow of capital, technology and consumption
transfer evolved 20 years ago. It dynamised the
Hungarian economy for a certain period and to
a certain extent, and increased social welfare.
After 20 years, however, it is a problem that the
Hungarian economy still formulates a similarly
structured range of needs and similar types of
expectations, i.e. the success of the Hungarian
economy continues to depend on keeping up for-
eign capital investments. Its development with-
out operating problems will last as long as the
level of capital investments does not decrease
considerably. Hungary has gradually become a
market economy driven by external resources
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over a period of two decades; the internal
processes of accumulation, however, did not
manage to steer the society's level of consump-
tion needs and the course of the budget perma-
nently towards a good and autonomous devel-
opment course. The volume of capital invested
and the accumulated production experience did
not become “internally self-boosting” produc-
tion factors, did not permanently stabilise the
budgetary situation, and did not broadly
improve the comfort of society. Another crite-
rion is that budgetary deficit became a system-
specific phenomenon in Hungary as early as in
the period of dynamic growth in the portfolio
of working capital; and even increasing rates
and figures of budgetary deficit became a spe-
cific characteristic of the system before the
corrective convergence programme of 2006
autumn.
In the life of a country that is shifting eco-
nomic and political arrangements and is seek-
ing a new development alternative, the model
selected and then integrated must be adapted to
the economic and historical past of the country,
to the development level of the existing eco-
nomic and social resources and to the potential
performance capacity of the existing economic
resources. Elimination of the socialist large-
scale industry and agriculture in Hungary was
practically completed by the mid-1990s.
Obsolete and discontinued production capaci-
ties were replaced by fresh and efficient foreign
capital. The majority of domestic strategic sec-
tors, vertical integration of production, new
technology branches, and services sectors were
transferred to or were developed through a cir-
cle of transnational corporations capable of
implementing more advanced technology and
more secure output, partly by way of privatisa-
tion and partly by way of green-field investors.
The inventory of the financial policy included
fiscal means of the government aimed at
Chart 1
A LINK OF INTEGRATION BETWEEN THE CENTRE AND THE CONVERGING SEMI-PERIPHERY IN
CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE 
(during the growth period, capabilities and expectations mutually boost each other, in crisis, dysfunctionality)
Source: A model developed by Lentner, Cs. (2009)
pressure to employ inexpensive and relatively qualified
labour force, motivated society
– export of high-standard culture of pro-
duction, services and consumption
a continuous need for external funding to manage the general
government deficit and the public debt
– portfolio capital export
means: production established in an emerging market econo-
my, adjusted to the needs of developed market economies
local macroeconomic characteristics: a fiscal policy with a
weak ability to advocate interests, a monetary policy not
focused on the internal organic development and suffering
from a compulsion to adapt to external factors, a society infil-
trated with politics and displaying weak cohesion
need to dynamise the economy – operating capital export 
Hungary
(expectations, needs)
Developed market economies
(capabilities)
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increasing the role of small and medium enter-
prises of domestic ownership in the national
economy, as well as direct means of monetary
policy until the mid-1990s;1 however, the vari-
ous government cycles, and sometimes even
measures taken during a cycle made supports
to the small entrepreneurial sector uneven and
their operation weak in terms of efficiency. 
A kind of “zigzag”,2 a lack of careful consider-
ation was seen in the supports to domestic
enterprises, which prevented the internal circle
of owners from gaining strength, and, conse-
quently, the evolution of a societal-scale middle
class (“middle-class status”) through the evolu-
tion of a domestic stratum of owners and
entrepreneurs. 
The key problem of the Hungarian transition
to a market economy is that in the period when
continuously growing and massive working capi-
tal was flowing in, the budget and the balance of
payments were constantly imbalanced – to a
growing extent at times –, while in terms of
households, a growing gap opened up between
the income expected from the new type of pro-
duction method and the actually achieved level.
The reform measures displaying a vision of a
permanent growth path (corrections in 1995,
2006, and 2008–2009), on the other hand,
shocked the public climate of the population
deeply influenced by politics; as a result, a sig-
nificant portion of the society became an
antagonistic opponent to reforms and ulti-
mately to resolving macroeconomic imbalance.
After 20 years, the results lend themselves to the
conclusion that the early economic successes and
the measures taken at the time of the regime
change in order to facilitate social welfare have
evaporated in the current decade that has nearly
passed by. A combination of weaker market and
profitability positions of and funding opportu-
nities to small and medium enterprises of
domestic ownership in comparison to those of
transnational corporations, as well as the crisis-
related decisions with a preference for nar-
rowed reproduction passed by the transnation-
al corporations that provide the majority of
Hungarian economic output have reduced the
total output of the national economy and, con-
sequently, the solvent demand of households
generated from labour income. The excessive
and unilateral dependence on foreign capital,
which evolved during the transition to
Hungarian market economy, coupled with the
unstable general government finances that
evolved as early as in the period of dynamic
capital influx after a while collectively result in
a reduced ability to attract capital, and, ulti-
mately, a reduced propensity of the resources
exclusively dynamising the Hungarian econo-
my to invest. Similarly to the decades of the
planned economy, the Hungarian society
socialised into an economic performance and
dynamism of wages perceive decelerated
growth already as a conflict situation. In the
current circumstances in Hungary, the majori-
ty population traditionally infiltrated with pol-
itics and rejecting the reforms offered so far
when expressing their political opinion and
when voting, combined with the economic sec-
tor displaying weaker performances along with
the set of economic conditions surrounding it
result in a deteriorated economic and social
competitiveness of Hungary.3, 4 This process,
or rather its final result – similarly to a chain
reaction – may lead to an extended crisis of the
democratic social arrangement, or to the twi-
light of the transition to a market economy and
the processes of democratisation seen so far.
(See Chart 2) The economic policy applied by
Hungary on the inception of the regime change
was considered as exemplary among the coun-
tries in transition from a planned economy to a
market economy, but also on a global econom-
ic scale.5 It can be justified subsequently that
the consequences of an economic and social
model adopted without deliberating each detail
of it are capable of wavering the achievements
of a Central Eastern European country that has
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run a fast but not fully organic development
course, like a chain reaction, accelerating after a
point. Adoption and application of a wrong
market economy model may generate perma-
nently chaotic conditions, in terms of both the
functioning of economic resources and the
social factor. 
THE ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE HUNGARIAN ECONOMY
Transnational companies globally may number
77 thousand, holding 800 thousand foreign
interests in total, as opposed to the 45 thou-
sand and 280 thousand as at 1995. It is charac-
teristic of their size and influence that they
generate half of the total global export. At the
turn of the millennium, their share was 30 per-
cent. They employ nearly 70 million people,
hardly one per cent of the global population.
The share of transnational corporations in the
Hungarian export is a globally outstanding fig-
ure – 65 per cent –, while in the Czech Republic
at a similar level of development is as low as 15
per cent. 
In the past two decades of the transition to a
market economy, the Hungarian economic pol-
icy has expressed a key preference for investors
of foreign working capital; consequently, their
role and economic influence have been rein-
forced. It is crucial, however, to refer to the
business policies of transnational corporations,
which maintain autonomy in organising the
combinations of input resources of production
and commercial services. The transnational
companies seek to minimise payments made to
the national budget, and even require tax
allowances, or, as seen in the recent years,
direct state subsidies for their operations, and,
increasingly frequently, to their settlement.
Through their subsidiaries and global expan-
sion, they are capable of internationally opti-
mising capital factors, i.e. they invest where the
historical input costs and taxes are the lowest,
while profit, available economic benefits and
influence on interests are the highest. After a
while, a conflict of interest between the recipi-
ent country and the settled corporations
emerge, however, they are capable of using their
economic potential to restrict the governments'
possibilities of market supervision and regulation,
as well as their intention of interest enforcement. 
Chart 2 
A CHAIN REACTION OF WRONG CONVERGENCE TO MARKET ECONOMY
(through the example of Hungary)
Source: A model developed by Lentner, Cs. (2009)
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On the road out of the transformation crisis
of the regime change as defined by Kornai,
János,6 it appeared to be a simpler and more
spectacular solution to promote foreign
investors to gain ground in the privatisation of
former state-owned companies, and to moti-
vate transnational corporations to invest
through green-field investments than to
improve and even out the “zigzag” of the
domestic entrepreneurial sector by way of
rational and lasting developments. Today,
though, problems have emerged on a massive
scale in both transnational companies and
enterprises of domestic ownership, which
influences the efficiency and latitude of the
government's economic political measures. In
this way, the government is faced with a sector
that has been weakened or rather failed to gain
strength in the first place – in terms of the
domestic SME sector –, and with a sector pro-
ducing a restrained output, in terms of interna-
tional companies.
Transnational companies feature high profit
repatriation, high costs of job creation and a
low propensity to pay public dues in compari-
son to their financial muscle and the subsidies
received. In the event of deteriorated or uncer-
tain input conditions (such as the current crisis
is), they are capable of withdrawing their pro-
duction equipment from the country in ques-
tion, due to their high mobility, or to shift to
narrowed reproduction processes. In such
cases, state tax revenues are diminished, and
problems are faced in the field of employment
and the balance of payments. The domestic
enterprises, however, cannot replace transna-
tional corporations due to their weak financial
muscle, and cannot fill the economic gap left
by such transferring transnational companies. 
Transnational corporations may induce
dynamisation in the economic life and social
relations of the receiving country, but they are
also capable of generating decline through their
departure. Their role in the period of economic
convergence in Hungary has had a positive bal-
ance so far; nevertheless, we are not prepared
for a world without transnational companies. It
is undoubted that they have brought in a high-
er-standard production culture, creating hun-
dreds of thousands of jobs, and boosted the
national economy to a certain extent, but in the
event their economic activity permanently
decreases, plummeting economic output,
emerging social conflicts and wavering achieve-
ments of the transition to a market economy
and democratisation are anticipated. The
Hungarian governments were not careful enough
when focusing their development and fiscal poli-
cies mostly on transnational corporations.
Transnational corporations are far from playing
such a crucial role in the economic lives of
Slovenia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and a
number of surrounding countries as they do in
Hungary. The domestic entrepreneurial sector,
and even the well-managed state-owned com-
panies have had a crucial role in Central Eastern
European countries other than Hungary, and
even in certain Western European countries. In
this way, the corporate business policy in place
in the countries of origin of transnational cor-
porations operating in Hungary is actually fully
mapped, and even has a formative effect on the
Hungarian social relations, too. It is material,
though, that the consequences of transnational
corporations' restricted production are more
severe in Hungary, which is strongly driven by
external fundamentals (i.e. is highly dependent
on foreign capital) and is in a weak budgetary
position anyway, compared to Western European
countries or some of the neighbouring countries
that feature better fiscal positions than Hungary
does. Governments in a more favourable situa-
tion than Hungary are able to provide more
resources in order to keep up the production
level of transnational corporations, consequently,
economic and social shocks are also smaller. 
A considerable part of the processing industry
that represents the main body of the Hungarian
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economy successfully stands the test of global
competition, too. It is well characterised by an
outstanding share – 21 per cent – of the export
of high technology products, which has
improved since the second half of the 1990s,
which is comparable to the figures of the
United States of America and the United
Kingdom at 27 per cent each, Japan at 20 per-
cent, Finland at 19 percent, and easily exceeds
the corresponding figures of the Central
Eastern European countries. The high technol-
ogy export, however, means assembly per-
formed for foreign companies, mostly from
imported parts, to a significant extent. The
import content of the entire Hungarian export is
60 percent, by far the highest among the OECD
countries.7 It is explained by the fact that the
export companies in developed countries retain
the most valuable phases of the value chain, the
ones that produce the highest added value, i.e.
the knowledge-intensive phases. In this way,
the knowledge deficit and the development gap
characteristic of the developed countries can
only be closed at a slow pace in Hungary. 
The philosophy of the Hungarian economic
policy that relied on transnational corporations
has ultimately generated an internal market
with a high propensity to consume, as a result
of growing production followed by an expand-
ed offer of products and services.
The output of the corporations producing in
Hungary and the increasing product export
practically provides the same product and serv-
ice offer as in developed market economies.
Further continuation of these is doubted, nev-
ertheless, and at the time of the credit crunch,
even bank financing of consumption faces
increasing problems. The Hungarian consumer
paradise built in a period of hardly 10 years on
the ruins of the planned economy is in ruins again
after another 10 years. The increasing income of
households decelerated as a result of the crisis,
the social transfers from the state kept ebbing
away, and the commercial banks achieving a 20-
per cent annual growth in loan disbursements
by subsequently crediting dynamically growing
consumption have faced a liquidity crisis since
the autumn of 2008. Both the production out-
put boosted by the transnational corporations
and the Hungarian consumers' paradise entered
a crisis, because the impetus of the Hungarian
economic policy relying on external resources
seen so far has broken. The propensity of
working capital and portfolio investors to
invest grew more difficult as a result of the eco-
nomic crisis and because of the rising market
risks, and it keeps generating the crisis.
INTERNATIONAL TRENDS 
IN CONSUMPTION
The economic vulnerability of the United
States of America was (also) caused by con-
sumption that permanently exceeded internal
production after a point. In 2007, Botos,
Katalin8 in her study on the permanently pas-
sive trade balance of the United States estab-
lished that the winning party was the one that
held the import surplus on real terms, provided
that funding it was not a serious obstacle. Until
the summer of 2007, practically until the end of
a “peacetime”, excessive consumption and
funding the deficit of the trade balances and the
balances of payment did not cause a serious
problem. 
A banking system that provided funding for cred-
its and a lending practice were also associated
with the consumption of an abundant choice of
products. Between 2003 and 2008, the deficit of
the USA's trade balance increased by 55.2 per
cent (see the analysis of Table 19), which repre-
sented a serious problem in the United States. In
Great Britain, the negative trade balance dou-
bled between 2003 and 2008, while in France, a
deficit of nearly USD 74 billion was generated by
2008, following a positive balance of USD 5.7
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billion in 2003 through a dynamic rise. It is to be
noted that the countries of the eurozone had pos-
itive trade balances in the years 2003 to 2005 and
in 2007, and again in 2009, while between 2008
and the first half of 2009 they were negative.
Underlying the favourable figures of the eurozone
compared to those of the United States – referring
to Botos, Katalin – was a slow strengthening of
the euro's economic role and its role as an inter-
national currency, i.e. “Europe could not afford
the luxury of shortage”. Saudi Arabia and Russia
owed their permanently positive balances to the
export of hydrocarbon derivatives, while
Germany, Japan and China to competitive
export that flooded the American and Western
European markets. As a result, basically two
country groups were formulated in global econo-
my: 1. countries that featured permanently nega-
tive trade balances, i.e. a society with a high
propensity to consume, a financial system that
transfers imported goods to consumers using less
inflexible financing techniques, and 2. countries
that are capable of a lasting export offensive due
to their competitive, marketable (partly strategic)
products. 
The crisis of the global economy developed
in the countries with a high consumption cul-
ture, and basically, these are afflicted by it,
although the traditionally “emitting” net
exporter countries are also affected through
the well-established “bilateral” trade relation-
ships, as the demand for their export decreases,
which curbs their performance and their
growth set to high rev. At the same time, the
figures in the balance of payments and the
trade balance are continuously improving in
the United States since the year-end of 2008,
which suggests a more economical consump-
tion practice of the American society moving
towards restriction, efficiency of the relevant
government measures, in parallel with a
decrease in the income available for consump-
tion, while an effect of the sectoral packages
aimed at rescuing banks and the automotive
industry weakening the budget is also marked-
ly present. The processes are worth watching.
The deficit in the American balance of payments
was USD 697.9 billion in December 2008 –4.5
per cent of the GDP –, while the deficit of the
trade balance was USD 851.3 billion.10 At the
end of June 2009, the deficit of the USA's balance
of payments in the latest 12 months was 3 per cent
compared to the GDP, which represented a USD
628.3 billion negative balance, while the deficit
of the trade balance amounted to USD 674.4 bil-
lion.11 At the end of 2009, the deficit of the bal-
Table 1
CHANGES IN THE TRADE BALANCE FIGURES IN A FEW COUNTRIES, 2003–2009 
(Data in billion USD)
Countries 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
USA –549.5 –634 –767.8 –842.2 –806.4 –853.1 –517.0
EMU +84.3 +100.1 +47.3 –24.1 +51.7 –40.4 +33.1
UK –74.4 –103.2 –115.5 –149.4 –165.8 –182.6 –128.1
France +5.7 –5.2 –28.9 –36.3 –47.4 –82.7 –59.1
China na. na. na. na. +259.8 +278.8 +173.0
Japan +100.6 +135.8 +98.2 +76.7 +107.6 +64.8 +43.5
Germany +142.7 +189.1 +202.9 +194.6 +263.1 +283.3 +191.2
Russia na. na. na. na. +124.0 +194.6 +112.1
Saudi Arabia na. na. na. na. +146.6 +150.8 212.0 
Source: data gathered by the author, from The Economist 
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ance of payments kept on decreasing, and reached
USD 465.3 billion, which represents 3 per cent of
the GDP, while the trade balance was at USD
517 billion. At the same time, the budget deficit
equalled 9.9 per cent of the GDP (currently, as at
the end of March 2010 it is already 11.1 per cent).
The United States and a number of other
market economies that struggle with a negative
balance of payments conveyed their internal
production and permanent import surplus that
had been growing for decades to the end-con-
sumers through various banking credit prod-
ucts. This financing method – and the “lenient”
financial regulatory system facilitating it – was
also adopted in the Hungarian practice. The
consumer credit portfolio of the households in
Hungary and in similar transitional market
economies underwent a dynamic expansion,
which generalised after a point, and a perma-
nent excess demand developed in the credit
market. The expansion of the credit portfolio
far beyond realistic properties acts as a self-
motivating process affecting both production
and consumption. The low-interest credits
were used by bank clients to refinance their
mortgage loans, to purchase new real estate and
to buy consumer goods. A spectacular develop-
ment was seen in the construction industry,
which resulted in an over USD 300 thousand
excess supply of real estate in the American
market in early 2008, for example.12 The apart-
ments built from credit could not be sold after
a while, and due to the potential buyers losing
solvency and a growing number of people
struggling with repayment problems, the cred-
its borrowed by the construction companies
were not repaid either, and then the liquidity of
mortgage banks wavered. The chain of con-
struction – selling – credit repayment, which
functioned for decades, was broken. 
Similarly, the construction industry became a
chief propulsive industry for GDP in Hungary;
however, residential real properties lost 20-25
per cent from their market values due to the
dynamic and then drastic rise in the number of
newly built flats that could not be sold after a
time. In the past years, investments in the
futures markets of raw materials and energy
jumped due to the low interest rates. The
increasingly liberal regulation of financial insti-
tutions and the activity of hedge funds basical-
ly free of any regulation provided an opportu-
nity for multiplying huge amounts. With the
capital gearing ratios rising, the supply in the
money market has been continuously growing,
and the prices of products and services are
exposed to significant speculation effects (see
oil, biofuels). Through the households on the
demand side of the money market and the con-
sumption generated by them, the growth path
of the corporate sector has also seen an explo-
sive rise. Maintenance of the growing con-
sumption backed by bank loans, with natural
coverage increasingly provided by other coun-
tries, has become unsustainable by now. 
The phenomenon of sub-prime13 developed in
Hungary, too, which produced a huge credit
expansion through lenient lending rules, funda-
mentally on the basis of the deregulatory and
free market principles called into existence by
the Washington Consensus. Liberalisation
came to be the cornerstone of the Hungarian
economic policy and economic regulation that
were rapidly moving towards a raw system of a
market economy from an inflexible system of a
planned economy. A similar production base –
controlled from developed countries –, an
unreasonable propensity to consume and a
practice facilitating unlimited credit multiplica-
tion to finance it along with the necessary reg-
ulation has evolved in Hungary, too, similarly
to the developed countries that had been devel-
oping their systems of market economies for
centuries, applying the principles of deregula-
tion to this base a good two decades ago.
Cutover to neoliberal market relations, to
developing and supporting behaviours that pre-
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fer consumers' paradise took place without the
due transition, and without thoroughly testing
the domestic relations and potential social
responses; it can be stated that it was generated
as a result of other than organic development.
In addition to importing the production capital
crucial to developing its market system,
Hungary also “imported” the habits of the
western consumer society, and the regulations
applicable to accounting and credit institutions
needed to ensure the set of economic condi-
tions of accommodating a productive capital
and unlimited consumption. 
The working capital and the culture of consump-
tion imported from the west, as well as the import
of portfolio capital aimed at bridging the central
budgetary imbalance may lead to operating dys-
functions in the recipient country, once the region
capable of capital export loses some of its financial
muscle and impetus. In this situation, western
reception of the product export flowing out of
Hungary is also faced with obstacles, the manu-
factured products cannot be sold; consequently,
the companies that have moved in restrict their
output. In the first four months of 2009, the pro-
duction of processing industry sectors typically in
foreign ownership dropped by 25.4 percent14 in
Hungary, and continued to be caused chiefly by
limited orders of the sectors producing for export
and their domestic suppliers. The most consider-
able plummets – 41 per cent each – were seen in
vehicle manufacturing, metallurgy and produc-
tion of fabricated metal products. Continuity of
economic setback is justified by the fact that in
months 1 to 9 2009, industrial production was
19.1 per cent behind that of the corresponding
period in the previous year.15
Amidst the uncertainty of Hungarian state
subsidies and the difficulties of the market,
they do not take risks, and do not maintain the
level of production previously established in
Hungary, as a result of which the labour
income and then the purchasing power of the
Hungarian households get weaker. The diffi-
culties of lending for financial institutions, the
ebbing primary sources of household and cor-
porate consumption do not allow retention of
the current dynamism of the Hungarian con-
sumption and internal utilisation. Further alle-
viation of the borrowing facilities, i.e. expan-
sion of the sub-prime circle cannot be contin-
ued any further for reasonable reasons. All
these result in reduced consumption and fur-
ther recession in the production that caters for
consumption. 
The last general government reform before the
crisis is dated as of the autumn of 2006.
Reduction of the budgetary deficit permanently
stuck at 10 per cent became a primary duty. For
the period of correction announced to last until
2010, as a combined effect of funds withdrawn
from the owners of income, and taxes raised
would have generated a total HUF 2500 bil-
lion16 in retained state transfers and allocation
of surplus tax revenues. The processes of inter-
national financial crisis emerging since 2007
kept up the alteration of the convergence path
set a year previously, and even a firmer reten-
tion of the fiscal results achieved up to that
point prevailed with reference to the crisis.
Consequently, the elimination of excessive
consumer preferences17 commenced as early as
before the events spiralling in the autumn of
2008. During the crisis, the Hungarian econo-
my, being driven by external capital, has had it
balance positions in deficit, its internal produc-
tion system and banking system have struggled
with a liquidity crisis, and it is able to provide
the consumers with decreasing supply in the
long run; nevertheless, the related financing
limits for loans have also shown a decreasing
tendency. As opposed to the American and
British governments, which rescue vehicle fac-
tories and production plants by providing state
funds and support schemes, it is unable to
increase demand using governmental means. In
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this way, the Hungarian society experiences a
crisis that is more severe than the decline of the
western consumer society. With the production
and supply diminished, consumption will soon-
er or later drop permanently.
The fast integration of Hungarian society's
propensity to consume with the western con-
sumer society was not a unique phenomenon in
the former countries of the CMEA,18 which, as
research by Csaba, László19 shows, is repre-
sented by high deficits in the balance of pay-
ments. In the post-millennial years in the Baltic
states, deficits of the balance of payments
exceeding 12–13 per cent of the GDP were
seen, while in Bulgaria and Romania, the deficit
ran ever higher.20 The lending practice of
“western” financial institutions obtaining a
monopoly of commercial lending through pri-
vatisation of the former state-owned banks had
a crucial role in the formulation of the Central
Eastern European imbalance. The transnation-
al corporations considered Central Eastern
Europe as a new market. The parent banks
being deregulated and their subsidiaries in the
region did not hinder conveyance of the multi-
national corporations' dumping-priced prod-
ucts and services to the societies of planned
economies expecting a consumers' paradise.
Not even despite the fact that consumers
proved to be decreasingly creditworthy clients
in the absence of primary income. The system
of banking supervision was only slightly able to
prevent lending to clients with weak creditwor-
thiness. As described by Csaba, László: the
central banks considerably lost their power
over the monetary base. 
Based on audited data published by the HFSA,21
the bank loans to households in Hungary
amounted to HUF 9144 billion as at the end of
2008, which, compared to the figures of 2004,
represents a 143.8-per cent rise. Concentrating
the scope of analysis to a short time interval – the
period of austerity measures launched as of
September 2006 –, the intensifying activity of the
Hungarian households in the credit market can
be demonstrated even more expressively. In the
period of reducing the budget deficit
(2006–2008), the loans to households rose from
HUF 5713 billion to the foresaid HUF 9144 bil-
lion, which is 60-per cent dynamics. 
PROBLEMS OF MONEY MARKET 
SUPERVISIONS
After outlining the nature of the Hungarian
crisis, it is important to analyse the financial,
supervisory and accounting regulatory envi-
ronment that facilitated an insufficiently pru-
dent transition to a market economy and
unlimited lending, as well as to assess the inte-
gration thereof initiated in the international
region, in addition to unilateral dependence on
foreign capital and the formulation of a con-
sumption-centred value system. 
The economic policy of the Washington
Consensus announced as of the late 1980s basi-
cally considered liberalisation of money and cap-
ital markets as its goal, in the hope that the mar-
kets were capable of self-regulation. In this sys-
tem, regulation and supervision of money mar-
kets gained completely new contents, still, the
crisis that developed after 30 years in the
American secondary mortgage market and that
spread across the entire banking sector and has
also reached industrial companies today has
inflicted serious damage on the authority and
influence of the American stock exchange
supervision. This is because continuous and
significant confinement of the responsibility of
the state and of supervisory control, in parallel
with the increasing independence of money
and capital markets, topped with the employ-
ment of business consulting companies to per-
form supervision under the Washington
Consensus subsequently turned out to be an
insufficiently deliberated action. The Hungarian
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regulation of money markets originally fea-
tured a kind of conservative, continental view
that has in the past 20 years changed to
approach the British-American model, which
increasingly prevails in the global economy, and
a “mellowed supervision” and a more “lenient”
regulatory attitude conveyed by it also affected
the Hungarian conditions.
Among those evaluating the negative effects
of the economic policy laid down in the
Washington Consensus, John Williamson22 and
Lányi, Kamilla23 in Hungary were the first to
call attention to the dangers of excessive liber-
alisation. Their key thesis is that economic
policies are centred on growth, and they fail to
address distribution of income and social poli-
cy in their right positions; moreover, the
authors even referred to inconsistency of the
reforms. 
Lányi, Kamilla24 explains that the international
financial system is only able to integrate compa-
nies that operate along the same principles in
deregulated environments controlled identically,
which, not negligibly, prefer the American type of
corporate control and supervision that has the
weakest audit practice. In this financial structure,
opportunities are available to develop financial
products that yield extra profit but entail high
risk. 
Becoming integral parts of globalising
money markets, the new financial innovations
are not only out of state regulation but also out
of sight of financial control and of those that
intend to review financial processes globally.
Problems are aggravated by the fact that the
financial regulation of the United States of
America generated the processes leading up to
the current crisis not only by failing to ensure
enforcement of a thorough regulatory system,
but also directly. 
Ten years after the Washington scheme was
adopted, a proposal on regulating the increas-
ingly expanding and non-transparent derivative
products was submitted to the Congress of the
USA, at the suggestion of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission. However, the
Congress rejected it, and opted for further
deregulation, thus facilitating further growth
of products transferring credit risk
(Collateralised Debt Obligation), credit deriv-
atives and work-out companies.
In the Hungarian practice, supervisory regula-
tion is laid on legal bases, and the Ministry of
Finance, the National Bank of Hungary and the
Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority
even signed a stability agreement in 2004 to
promote harmony between the tasks and the
scopes of responsibility.25 The effectiveness of
the stability agreement and the supervisory
activities of the participating institutions – in
the light of the unfolding crisis-can be termed
as weak, similarly to that of the American
supervision and credit rating agencies. In the
past 5 years in Hungary, credit disbursements
of the banking sector rose by 20 per cent annu-
ally. Exceeding its labour income and social
benefits, society spent considerably more on
consumption. What is more, bank credit appli-
cations were topped by withdrawals performed
under the reform of the general government,
which did not restrict the households' propen-
sity to consume, and they even had a chance of
abundantly replacing lost income from the
banking market in the alleviated regulatory
environment; although HFSA called the atten-
tion of the relevant decision makers to its
unsustainability.26
Increasing the disbursement of funds with-
out sufficient funding – in the form of con-
sumer credits and housing loans – was also a
fundamental interest of the government, which
displayed weakening financial and political effi-
ciency, in order to avoid worsening of the social
climate. HFSA, which acted as a government
agency, although perceived the emerging problem,
could hardly take any action in the course of
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excessive lending, in the absence of specific
authority to intervene and to restrict the dynam-
ics of lending. The Hungarian supervisory sys-
tem – seeing the ultimate effect – was just as
much incapable of materially reducing risks
intrinsic to excessive lending, as the American
system failed to live up to the expectations,
although the operation of the Hungarian
supervisory system contains no contradictions
between the scopes of responsibility and the
financing model. The dynamics of the credit
overflow in past 2–3 years, as well as the lack of
consequences of the HFSA reports criticising
it represents an underlying conflict of contra-
dicting government interests. The Hungarian
government urged stabilisation through with-
drawals from the households and improvement
of the financial discipline, still it did not restrict
abundant credits disbursed to insolvent
debtors for social and political reasons.27
It can be established concerning both the
Hungarian and the American lending system
that the internal invasion of production and
imports generated by consumption led to an
unlimited credit disbursement practice that was
increasingly less secured after a while.
The supervisory curbs built into the system
did not function. As a result, the credit portfo-
lio and its derivative transactions overflowed,
and became largely unsecured. 
It grew to be a general banking practice that the
bank disbursed multiple times the amount of
loans generated by it through the involvement of
structured investment vehicles (SIV28) to other
actors in the financial sector, thus distributing risk
across the system. After a point, this model results
in barely transparent forms of investment that are
difficult to regulate, which also pushed the British
Northern Rock bank towards a crisis in
September 2007, because the value of the portfo-
lio previously securitised by it decreased, and the
bank was unable to securitise its new loans.
Serious liquidity problems emerged within a
short time,29 after the liabilities underlying the
assets represented in the balance sheet disap-
peared. It is observable in liquidity crises of this
type that the lack of funding in the SIV would be
replaced from the funding credit line provided by
the bank, which further deepens the liquidity cri-
sis of the bank. In addition, as the crisis spreads,
financial institutions acting as net lenders restrict
their activities; consequently, losses, the resulting
write-off and need for consolidation drastically
rise,30 and the state or an external investment
group interested in acquisitions have entered as
guarantors – in the absence of the bank's own
funding. Crumbling of the most frequent method
of crisis management prior to this crisis, M&A
(merger and acquisition) activity, was a direct
consequence of ebbing liquidity in the global
money and capital markets, caused by deteriorat-
ed repayment abilities of subprime American
mortgage debtors. Investment banks – not only
Americans – incorporated these liabilities in
investment products with various weightings to
be offered on the global money market with a
view to distributing risks; however, in the wake of
the severe waver of the American residential real
estate market, investor demand for these product
practically ebbed away with the deepening of the
crisis. Moreover, banks have also been in a tight
situation in the wholesale liquidity market, as
they were unaware of the various actors' involve-
ment in the market of securitised subprime liabil-
ities, and consequently were reluctant to provide
short-term financing even to one another in the
interbank money market.
In the period 2007–2008, the supervisions
did not have sufficient information on banks'
exposure on the mortgage market and the port-
folio of infected securities, which hindered cri-
sis management. The Basel-based calculation
method of capital requirements did not prove
efficient in this non-transparent situation, and
the practice of risk management could not live up
to the expectations. On riskier changes to the
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classic model of banking, the institution of
securitisation was assigned an increasing role in
parallel with the mortgage-based financing to
households expanding, whereby the credit risk
was partly or fully transferred to capital market
investors.31 The supervisory methods, howev-
er, were unsuited to manage risks and enforce
rules. The first capital regulation laid down in
Basel in 1988 already addressed riskier banking
activities, derivatives. The Committee adopted
the notion of credit equivalent amounts and
intended to secure off-balance sheet exposures
with capital. In 1996, the new set of guidelines
laid down by the Committee permitted banks
to apply their own most efficient risk manage-
ment practices. Adoption of Basel II in 2006
did not contain innovations from this aspect,
either, and recognition and comprehensive reg-
ulation of special risks were missing again. 
The regulation and supervision in Hungary
function in line with the norms of the European
Union, and reflect the quality of supervision in
developed market economies also in terms if
efficiency. The domestic banking system has
almost fully integrated with that of the devel-
oped market economies, and the Hungarian
banks are mostly owned by foreign (parent)
banks. As a joint consequence of all these, the
domestic lending processes and supervisory
modifications follow the trends evolving in the
developed market economies, even if they leave
much to be desired. In the summer of 2008, the
HFSA justifiably called the attention of the
domestic financial sector and their clients to
the increasing risk exposures,32 and, conse-
quently, to the increasing costs of money-mar-
ket and bond-market funding, the deteriorating
situations and decreasing support of parent
banks, as well as the worsening profit
prospects, in particular. It is expedient for the
supervision to pay special attention in the
future to the valuation processes and methods,
particularly the adequacy of VaR measure-
ments33 and management of liquidity risks.
More efficient regulation of leveraged financial
products and the financial institutions dealing
with them, as well as implementation of con-
trol over them are high-priority supervisory
tasks. 
The status of the Hungarian supervisory
authority is settled, its stability forecasts are
reliable; to what extent the government utilises
the information received is a different issue.
According to the concept of the previous
(Bajnai) government,34 the Hungarian
Financial Supervisory Authority would become
the consumer protection authority in the
financial sector, i.e. the consumer protection
act will become applicable in terms of financial
service providers and products. This measure
can be considered as a kind of sequel to the act
adopted in September 2008 on the prohibition
of unfair trade practices. Introduction of the
legal institution of a financial ombudsman,
however, is currently a mere plan, although
establishment of a new role would provide a
facility to raise general problems on the basis of
individual declarations, and present them to the
competent bodies and the public opinion.
Although, the real solution to the situation
would be filling the existing legal institutions
with true and effective contents, instead of
introducing a new one.
At numerous points around the world, for exam-
ple in the United States, too, reconsideration
combined with a discussion of the supervisory
roles is going on.35 By establishing a Consumer
Financial Protection Agency (CFPA), the con-
sumer protection duties currently assigned to a
number of authorities would be assigned to a new
organisation. CFPA would monitor compliance
with mortgage and bank card contracts. The
American stances are unified in their opinion
that the supervisory procedure insufficiently cov-
ers agents selling real estate loans and large finan-
cial corporations, and consequently, financial
institutions may gain dominance of power over
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consumers. It is still debated, however, whether to
assign the licences to the federal reserve banks
(FED) or to a new supervisory authority. In
Great Britain, a Financial Ombudsman Service
has been in place since 2001, which works in
cooperation with but independently from the
local financial supervision (Financial Services
Authority). The ombudsman is competent in all
products, and offers their services free of charge;
however, confidence towards them has been shak-
en since the crisis of the banking system.
ACCOUNTING REGULATION AND THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS
During the crisis, not only governments but also
enterprises faced serious difficulties. On restor-
ing market confidence, the auditors and conse-
quently the professionally audited annual
reports have received more attention, particu-
larly securitisation processes that proved to be
an efficient behaviour of loss control in the
past two decades.36 The issuer companies are
required to provide information that highlights
potential risk and the detailed properties of the
instrument. The auditors are required to issue
an opinion on the issuance brochures attracting
greater and more critical market attention com-
pared to the previous years. 
The International Auditing and Assurance
Standards Board (IAASB) published a practice
alert concerning the auditing challenges to esti-
mations based on fair value. The facts that affect
the principle of going concern emerge exponen-
tially, as the measures taken to restore the econo-
my can be measured through them. The liquidity
risks markedly raise the principle of going con-
cern, to see how it is represented, or, on the con-
trary, how endangered it is. In their audit reports,
the auditors need to highlight an evaluation of the
company management's work and decisions.
Should the auditor's opinion not agree with the
management's opinion, it is to be indicated in
order to provide correct information to the mar-
ket actors. The greatest loser in the crisis so far has
been the financial sector and the financial instru-
ments; consequently, the accounting profession
currently primarily focuses on settling and valu-
ing these. It is an international crisis manage-
ment measure concerning the accounting profes-
sion that IASB set up a group consisting of finan-
cial and accounting experts in 2008 (Expert
Advisory Panel), with the primary task of devel-
oping practical guidelines applicable to situations
of determining fair value when no active market
price is available.
As a result of amended international stan-
dards, the Hungarian accounting requirements
have also changed, particularly in the field of
reclassifying financial instruments. The amend-
ment to the Hungarian accounting act effective
as of the end of 2008 facilitates reclassification
of financial instruments for trading in the event
of using valuation at fair value, due to the
extraordinary circumstances. The areas to be
highlighted on auditing are assessments of the
company's crisis management, representations
and the business environment, disclosure of
the fair values, management of the risk of
fraud, as well as the principle of going concern.
The new challenges and effects arise in various
areas with varying severity within companies. It
is mostly companies with interests in foreign
markets, suppliers of the automotive industry
and construction companies that have been in
the epicentre of the crisis. On evaluation of the
annual reports for 2008 performed by auditors,
the procedures of establishing fair value, hedge
accounting and provisioning were paid special
attention. In order to assess going concern, the
auditor needs to devote special attention to
evaluating the dynamics of orders, changes in
the customer base, breaches of the agreements
between the bank and the customers, restric-
tion of bank financing and the circumstances of
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extending loan terms. On planning the audit
work, risk assessment, materiality, assessment
of the risk of errors and consideration of docu-
mentations are given more emphasis. 
By virtue of the Hungarian economy's
strong dependence on external capital and reg-
ulation, the anti-crisis measures of accounting
and regulation of financial institutions are only
conceivable under the umbrella of internation-
al regulation, i.e. stabilisation of the regulatory
environment of the Hungarian economy may
depend on the effectiveness of international
regulation or its efficient adoption. 
The G-20 summit convened in order to man-
age the crisis considered improvement in the
accounting of financial instruments to be a pri-
ority task, with the definition of the fair value
and the impairment loss of credits within it.
The G-20 summit confirmed the measures of
the Financial Stability Forum taken to enhance
accounting standards. In the light of this, it is
desirable to decrease complexity in the
accounting rules of financial instruments, to
consider broader credit information on
accounting credit impairment, to improve the
accounting standards applicable to provisions,
off-balance sheet items and valuation uncer-
tainties, to harmonise the activities of supervi-
sions in order to apply the valuation standards.
Not least, participation of regulatory organisa-
tions and emerging markets in the independent
system of setting up accounting standards
needs improvement with the help of the IASB.
HOW TO PROCEED? 
Two fundamental techniques exist for manag-
ing the crisis that reached the real economy by
the autumn of 2008. The central banks and
governments are regularly faced with the con-
flict that if they act against the economic reces-
sion – pumping extra state funds into the econ-
omy –, they risk a repeatedly increasing deficit
and accelerated inflation. If, however, they pre-
fer to act against inflation and to retain the
budgetary balance, they are to expect a reces-
sion in the economy. 
The United States of America and a number
of European countries seek to rescue dying
industries by way of state subsidies, and, where
it is viable, they reduce the tax burdens on
enterprises, in the hope of revving up produc-
tion, and then, consumption. Subsidies are
funded from budgetary expenses, while tax
cuts reduce budget revenues, and, in combina-
tion, increase the budgetary deficit. 
Hungary cannot repeatedly commit the mis-
take of adapting any of the practices without
due caution, although in the period close to a
national bankruptcy, there was not even a real-
istic possibility of these crisis management
actions. Crisis management and even utilisa-
tion of external assistance are hindered by the
fact that since 2001 Hungary has had no marked
strategy of organic convergence to the technical
and technological level represented by the devel-
oped world37. The Hungarian economic crisis is
not only a result of fiscal and central bank deci-
sions of poor efficiency spanning across gov-
ernments, but also a concomitant of the com-
pulsion to comply with the excessive expecta-
tions of the population, which anticipates the
shortage economy to turn into a consumers'
paradise immediately and permanently. The
Hungarian banking system has also created the
credit volume technically needed to meet con-
sumer needs, which was implemented as a more
lenient regulatory system for lending and funds
multiplication. 
The new path of convergence started as of
the autumn of 2006 in combination with the
aborted healthcare and higher education
reform measures as at the spring of 2008
brought about a difficult situation in Hungary
by the autumn of 2008. On the one hand, the
preferred profit targets of the convergence pro-
gramme in the narrow sense were justified, even
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if temporarily, whereas the social support to the
austerity measures grew disastrous. Nevertheless,
the consolidated cash deficit of the general
government deficit in the first ten months of
2008 – until the crisis set in – amounted to
HUF 454 billion less compared to the corre-
sponding period of the 2007. The improved
balance is basically attributable to the reduced
central budgetary deficit, which, at HUF 828
billion, is HUF 565 billion below that of 2007.
The social security funds had a positive balance
even at the end of 2008. With decelerated
macroeconomic growth combined with
improving balances, the positions of house-
holds had unfavourable tendencies. In the first
nine months of 2008, the gross financial assets
of households amounted to HUF 25 trillion
(HUF 25.7 trillion at year end), which is 6 per
cent more than the nine-month figure twelve
month earlier. The liabilities of households in
the same period, however, grew by 20 percent.
Within this, the foreign currency credits stated
on the side of foreign currency liabilities
increased by 40 per cent during a year.38
Unfavourable tendency of the household debts
and net financial assets, i.e. indebtedness kept
growing in the crisis-stricken year of 2008. The
surplus government revenues generated as a
result of the budget adjustment were used up
by the end of 2008, consequently, the govern-
ment funds that could be used to help the
household sector practically ran out.
Moreover, a combination of continuously
growing indebtedness of the households, the
measures of transnational companies that
restricted production and induced unemploy-
ment, as well as the freezing of the primary
bank loan market generated a situation close
to bankruptcy. In the autumn of 2008, the for-
eign investors in government securities with-
drew government bonds close to the HUF
equivalent of 1100 billion from the govern-
ment securities market, which created a disas-
trous situation. It was the standby credit of
EUR 20 billion provided by the World Bank
and the ECB for a term of 18 months that has
saved Hungary from bankruptcy, which also
further reinforces the fact that the Hungarian
economy depends on external portfolio capi-
tal – as outlined earlier in this paper. It is an
interesting point in the crisis management as
at the end of October 2008 that foreign
investors did not return to the Hungarian
government securities market despite a classic
rise in the central bank base rate (by 300 basis
points), although by February 2010, activity
in the government securities market was grad-
ually gaining speed, and today, foreign invest-
ments of the HUF equivalent of 2400 billion
are present in the government securities mar-
ket, along with an all-time low central bank
base rate of 5.75. 
The Hungarian economic policy may only
apply the crisis management techniques of
developed market economies only after careful
adaptation, due to its weakened positions in all
fields. From the non-existent budget reserves,
the Hungarian government is unable to sup-
port foreign automotive factories operating in
Hungary, currently short of market orders.
Neither can it expect a material impact that
would affect the whole of the national econo-
my from potential supports to the small and
medium enterprises of domestic ownership
that have been suffering from a market loss for
20 year on end. The measures taken by
Hungary against bankruptcy cannot accommo-
date considerable cuts on taxes imposed on
either production or consumption. Today, the
classic means of fiscal policy deployable against
the Hungarian crisis are restricted.
The use of classic central bank crisis manage-
ment measures (such as raising the base rate)
has been to no effect so far. Due to a weak
assessment of the government's fiscal policy, a
higher central bank base rate and, through it,
improved yields in the government securities
market failed to win back the investments of
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foreign investors to the market, which repre-
sents restricted applicability of Hungarian cen-
tral bank measures at the time of crisis. The
funds needed to keep up an ever-diminishing
general government system are expected to be
provided from the standby credit for a long
period, consequently, the recession of the
Hungarian economy in terms of production
and consumption is foreseen as longer than in
the case of developed and capital-strong mar-
ket economies.
In the British-American countries and in
Western Europe, it is a general supposition that
the budgetary funds spent on the crisis are not
aimed at helping banks and companies but at
avoiding the crash of national economies.
By the early 21st century, the economic policy
advocating stimulation of demand by the gov-
ernment, associated with John Maynard Keynes
is living its second renaissance in the economic
political practice of countries external to Europe.
The European countries are prepared to
increase the ownership share of the state –
even if temporarily only –, which may as well
generate new internal social and economic
political relations – even if temporarily. In
Hungary, however, using a growing ownership
share of the state as a means of crisis manage-
ment is yet to be awaited even at a conceptual
level. In the practice of the European countries
and the United States, budget reserves signifi-
cantly higher than that of Hungary, and even
state transfers provided to the debit of increas-
ing the deficit, and at times, decreased enter-
prise taxes may establish an adequate basis for
repeated application of the Keynesian ele-
ments of economic policy,39 which, however,
may result in additional problems. The deficit
of the United States' federal budget in the first
10 months of the financial year ended in
September 2009 was USD 1300 billion, which
is USD 880 billion more in comparison with
the first 10 months of the previous financial
year. The deficit increment results from pro-
grammes launched to rescue banks and from
the economy-boosting programme announced
in the spring of 2009 at a value of nearly HUF
800 billion, as well as from a decrease of federal
revenues due to the economic recession. The
cost of life buoys provided by the state and the
inflation effect of the resulting government
debt combined with the burden of financing
will hinder emergence from the crisis, and may
generate new tensions also in the credit mar-
kets. The American budget deficit in propor-
tion to the GDP may move in the range of 9 to
13 percent, which may be the highest since the
years following World War II.
The unfavourable processes taking place in
the Hungarian fiscal and monetary policy and
the nature of the crisis management provided
so far suggest restricted latitude for the new
government to be formulating in the summer
of 2010. No doubt, the Hungarian banking sys-
tem is stable, with capital adequacy above the
requirement; however, any increase in the cur-
rently 4-per cent budget deficit may be
received badly by IMF. According to the prom-
ise made to the International Monetary Fund
on signing the credit agreement,40 reduced
financing requirement of the state and
improved long-term maintenance of the budg-
et balance are items that the next government
cannot ignore either. Intensified credibility and
economical management of the fiscal policy,
production boosted concurrently with tax cuts
and the related concurrent improvement of the
domestic demand side using government meas-
ures, as well as intensified demand of interna-
tional markets may be factors to decrease the
country's dependence on the standby credit.
What is more, expansive external lending pro-
vided to finance productive investments
through an authentic new economic policy may
also be seen as a realistic alternative.
Diversification of external markets, finding
new segments and aiding the domestic solvent
demand through state measures – concurrently
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with boosting supply – using a similar tech-
nique as at the time of implementing Széchenyi
National Development Plan are of material
importance. At the same time, domestic
authors – Báger – Pulay41 – state that the role of
the state needed for emerging from the crisis is
more complex than in the countries capable of
spending huge amounts to alleviate the effects of
the crisis, or, let us add, even in Hungary 12 years
previously.
It follows from the Hungarian economy's
dependence on external fundaments and regu-
lation that the crisis may be controlled and the
national regulation reinforced through correct
and prudent adaptation of crisis management
procedures launched from the international
field, which may yield results also in a socio-
economic environment displaying a new
approach. 
The Hungarian money markets have a spe-
cific legislative background to regulation and a
system of mechanisms; however, with the
financial and economic political approach of
the Washington Consensus adopted, the
Hungarian governments did not have an
opportunity to practice supervision of money
markets with due efficiency and, chiefly, due
results. As a consequence, market based financ-
ing and credit risk of the general government
and the banking system are faced with a num-
ber of difficulties. Due to funding from fiscal
resources and the limited effectiveness of the
means of central bank intervention, effective-
ness of the Hungarian crisis management is
only possible in the short run through renewed
accounting regulation that facilitates presenta-
tion of the relations of money market supervi-
sion and correct business. In its current situa-
tion, Hungary may do the most for regaining the
confidence of market actors – either in the short or
in the medium term – by effectively adopting
anti-crisis measures and rules of international
financial organisations and bodies formulating
accounting standards. 
The decision-making bodies of the European
Union have presented multiple recommenda-
tions in the field of supervision and regulation.
The most specific of these is adoption of prompt
corrective actions,42 which is in theory suitable to
indicate problems to the authorities holding spe-
cial rights prior to the crisis, in order to facilitate
then to carry out the least expensive solutions.
This method of the Unites States has been adopt-
ed by multiple countries (Canada, Japan), but it
is in place only in Switzerland and Norway in
Europe, although they show only slight similari-
ties. A generally used feature of this system is nor-
mativeness that requires mandatory actions to be
taken when predefined conditions are met. Such
may be interventions affecting ownership rights
(replacement of the management even in the
event of the owners' resistance) or the institutions
of accelerated wind-up, liquidation of banks or
forced nationalisation. The toolkit of the
advanced PCA method contains an institution of
bridge banks, where the government accommo-
dates a financial institution in crisis, and where
the necessary measures of reorganisation are car-
ried out over a period of 1-3 years. The final
objective of the procedure is to restore the bank to
the market as an independent entity, or maybe to
sell it, but once it is unsuccessful, the bank is
wound up or actually nationalised. A difficulty of
using the PCA method is that it is insensitive to
managing confidence problems and the resulting
liquidity problems. A PCA method further devel-
oped and more limited in function, however, may
be a crucial element of future supervisory systems.
The work of supervisions primarily consists of
crisis prevention activities. Crisis management is
rarely performed, in unique cases only, and nor-
mally entails no more than assigning a superviso-
ry commissioner, or reviewing an already issued
licence. On winding up a multinational financial
group, however, even national controversies may
ensue, as based on the principle of home bank-
ing, the foreign supervision – associated with the
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parent bank – and the domestic authorities start
blaming each other. Although an EU directive is
in place concerning the wind-up and reorganisa-
tion of credit institutions, but these primarily
regulate the way the depositors are to be notified
in such situations. In addition to this, a require-
ment of an asset maintenance ratio also exists in
Hungary, with a view to keeping the assets held
in Hungary by a credit institution branch origi-
nating from a country external to the EU always
above the value of funds raised. 
On 1 October 2008, the European Commission
published a draft amendment to the capital
requirements directives (CRD43) applicable to
credit institutions and investment enterprises,
which was submitted for decision-making to the
European Council and the European Parliament.
According to the Commission's plans, the
amendment proposals are accepted by the
Council and the Parliament, and then, they need
to be adopted by the member states until 31
January 2010, and applied by credit institutions
and investment enterprises as of 31 March 2010.
The amendment proposals of the Commission
are particularly focused on modifying the frame-
works of supervisory cooperation, and, accord-
ingly, strengthening the home supervisory juris-
dictions in the field of requiring added capital
and data supply, and recognition of hybrid
instruments as tier 1 capital elements, as well as
reinforcement of the capital and risk manage-
ment rules for securitisation positions. 
Probably one of the key areas of anti-crisis
action in the European regulator work is regula-
tion of the operations of credit rating institu-
tions. Credit rating institutions are private com-
panies that pursue insufficiently regulated oper-
ation; they act upon a code of conduct only. The
rating agencies, however, play an important role
in market stability, and this is why it is important
to have them under authority control. In
October 2008, the finance ministers of the EU
formulated a joint position concerning the 
crisis, in which, among others, they made a
proposal to assess the role of credit rating insti-
tutions and to manage all discrepancies arisen
in connection with the crisis. At its meetings
held on 20 June and 16 October 2008, the
European Council addressed restoration of the
market confidence and proper operation of the
financial sector as a key issue, and, accordingly,
tightening the rules applicable to credit rating
agencies. A priority objective of the new rules
is to support establishment of credit rating
institutions that do not reflect conflicts of
interest characteristic of the rating business. In
the light of this, credit rating institutions are
not allowed to carry out business consultancy,
and they must provide information on the
models, methods and basic assumptions used
for producing their ratings, they must publish a
transparency report on an annual basis, as well
as establishing an internal review department in
order to control the completed ratings.
NOTES
1 Until the mid-1990s, the central bank opened a refi-
nancing credit line to support small and medium
enterprises and agricultural producers. The most
widely known are: E-hitel (E-loan), Start-hitel (Start
loan), a credit line for bill rediscounting, agricultural
bill rediscounting, green credit for spring farm work,
loans to replenish long-term revolving funds. The
central bank's refinancing policy supporting the pro-
duction sector was discontinued with the central
banks' stronger efforts at independence, i.e. with the
technical conditions of monetary integration gaining
ground. Separating the central bank positions from
the fiscal policy is a reasonable decision, however, in
the author's opinion, it happened too early – being
aware of the shortage of capital in the Hungarian
economy and in the circle of domestic owners at the
time. For more information on this subject, see
Lentner, Cs. (2003)
2 For more information on the “zigzag” in the fiscal
policy and its social consequences, see Lentner, Cs.
(2002, 2005)
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3 For more information on a scientific taxonomy of
competitiveness, see Török, Á. (2008a). For more
information on the (partial) forces affecting the
economy, healthcare, higher education and the soci-
ety within the competitiveness of the national
economy and their models, see Lentner, Cs. (2007
a, b, c) 
4 A more detailed discussion of the correspondences
of competitiveness is provided in Kovács, Árpád
(2005, 2007). According to his stance, growth and
development both assume and implicate that a coun-
try or even a social model is competitive.
“Measurement” of competitiveness, similarly, entails
a peculiar social aspect: “Competitiveness is also pri-
marily construed in terms of a nation's performance
and development”. 
5 For more details on deteriorating performance and
competitiveness of the Hungarian market economy,
see a paper by the former Minister of Economy in
the first Orbán cabinet, Matolcsy, György (2008), in
his book entitled “Éllovasból sereghajtó” (“From
front-runner to straggler”).
6 Definition of the transformation crisis is associated
with the name of Kornai, János (1993). In the inter-
im phase between the planned economy and the mar-
ket economy (when the old structure did not func-
tion anymore, and the new one did not start func-
tioning yet – in a “free approximation” by Lentner,
Cs.”) the GDP underwent a 30-per cent decrease,
which completely rearranged the current structure
and system of the economy and the society. 
7 The import contents of Japanese export are approxi-
mately 10 percent, but the Finnish indicator does not
reach 35 per cent either. In more detail:
Versenyképességi évkönyv (Competitiveness
Yearbook), 2008
8 Botos, K. (2007), the study presents a detailed analy-
sis of the difficulties concerning the balance of pay-
ments and the currency of global economic centres.
9 The figures in the table: issues of the British eco-
nomic periodical, The Economist, December 20th,
2003, December 18th 2004, December 24th 2005,
December 16th 2006, December 22nd 2007,
December 20th 2008, July 25th 2009, February 25th
2010. Consequently, I present the USA's trade bal-
ances as at the end of calendar years, i.e. those of the
12 months preceding the month of December (the
latest 12 months). In the USA, the fiscal year and the
calendar year are not identical. 
10 The Economist December 20th, 2008
11 The Economist, July 25th 2009, Febr 25th 2010 
12 Losoncz, M. (2008) identifies falling real estate
prices and the associated decline in housing con-
structions as one of the three interrelated factors
underlying the crisis.
13 Massive appearance of second-rate (i.e. often not
creditworthy) debtors on the credit market and
credits provided to them for mostly consumption
purposes, i.e. for unproductive lending purposes,
generally by “money lenders” or so-called non-tra-
ditional banks [for example, Provident
Magyarország Rt. (a subsidiary of the British
Provident), KP Hitel in Hungary]. The absence of
an income certificate or of an official employer rep-
resented no obstacle to credit disbursement.
14 Source of data: KSH jelenti 2009/4 (reported by the
Central Statistical Office (KSH) in 04.2009). KSH
Ecostat, Budapest. A dramatic and accelerating
plummet in the Hungarian industrial production is
justified by the data published in The Economist:
the setback in October 2008 was 7.2 per cent,
whereas in May 2009, 22.1 per cent. The flagship of
the domestic vehicle industry, being also one of the
largest Hungarian production company, Gyõr-
based Audi Hungaria Motor Kft. published its fig-
ures on manufacture on 31 July 2009 for the first
half of the year. The series of data reveal that until
the end of June 2009, 661 847 engines were manu-
factured in Gyõr. It represents a nearly 35-per cent
decline compared to the 1 023 228 units of the cor-
responding period in the previous year.
(www.origo.hu/üzletinegyed)
15 Export sales decreased by 20.5 per cent, domestic
sales by 12.6 per cent in comparison with the corre-
sponding figures one year previously. Decrease in
vehicle manufacturing amounted to 33 per cent.
KSH 2009/11.
16 Lentner Cs.(2007/a). The paper quantifies the joint
value of withdrawals and extra burdens of HUF
2500 billion planned for 4 years, with a starting
point of reducing the deficit in relation to the GDP.
17 Dynamic integration of latent needs with the effec-
tive needs is not visible in all fields of the standard
of living; at the same time, purchase of vehicles,
mobile phones, real estate and foreign holiday with-
out a self-financed portion became symbols of a
new feeling of life. A “lenient” lending practice in
? STUDIES ?
581-605__LentnerCs__A.qxd  2010.08.31.  17:36  Page 601
? STUDIES ?
602
the last decade helped goods not necessarily needed
for living become “everyday reality”. Child mortal-
ity, data of increasing numbers of addictive patients
(and statistics referring to a number of other life
circumstances), however, do not reflect the fact that
people would live in more advanced circumstances
in terms of quality of life.
18 Analysts Backé – Égert – Walko (2007) show that
growth in small sized open countries cannot
become independent of the position of the external
balance of payments, even in the medium term.
Analysts of the imbalance seen in the Baltic states
and in Romania [Darvas – Szapáry (2008a, 2008b)]
explain the formulation of the deficit by the peculi-
arities of the system of a planned economy as of ear-
lier times (state investments, military industry), and
then by the boom driven by personal consumption
in the circumstances of a market economy. It must
be added, however, that Hungary is unique also in
this respect (it struggles with general comprehen-
sive problems), because of the fact that it is driven
by external fundamentals, which represent exclu-
siveness in its national economy, its set of exchange
rates is unstable (as opposed to that of Bulgaria,
Romania and certain Baltic states), its general gov-
ernment finances are unstable, and its “definition of
the identity of its economic policy” (Veress, J.,
2007) is yet to be awaited, while Bulgaria, for
instance, has significantly reduced its public debt,
uses a set of exchange rates fixed to the euro, and,
consequently, the national currency has no fluctua-
tions. Cf. fluctuations of the Hungarian forint:
HUF 317 (as in March 2009) and HUF 266.61 (as
at 4 March 2010).
19 Csaba, L. (2009 a, b). The author explains that
Hungary has lost its advantages gained at the time
of the regime change; consequently, it is consider-
ably out of line with the countries in a similar situa-
tion that acceded to the EU concurrently with it. 
20 The deficit in Bulgaria reached 17.8 per cent of the
GDP in 2006, 21.5 per cent in 2007, and is expected
to be at 14.5 per cent by 2008, and at 11 per cent by
2009. The corresponding expected deficit figures in
Romania for the same years are 10.4, 13.9, 14.2 per
cent, respectively, and 13.5 per cent by 2009.
[Figures by Csaba, László (2009 a)] 
21 Source of credit dynamics data: a report entitled
“Risk outlook” published by HFSA in May 2009
22 Being a reviewer of the Washington Consensus,
Williamson, John (2003) establishes a unilateral
growth-centredness and omission of secondary
reforms. 
23 Lányi, Kamilla (1997) presents the correspondences
of the North American and Western European eco-
nomic processes. 
24 Lányi, Kamilla (2000) refers to a probability of cer-
tain crisis processes as early as in the period of
unlimited ground gained by the processes of global-
isation.
25 In more detail about the Hungarian stability agree-
ment, see Lentner, Cs. (2006), and about an assess-
ment thereof, see Boros, A. – Lentner, Cs. (2008)
26 The activity of fast money lenders in the secondary
credit market was of unchanged intensity also in 2009,
although it is now a stipulation in their advertisements
that they are capable of providing still the fastest cred-
it available, although not at the lowest rates.
27 Correction of the fiscal path and elimination of the
deficit that was sticky until 2006 yielded consider-
able results by the end of 2008, as the deficit in a
percentage of the GDP hardly reached 3 percent. It
was chiefly due to rationalisation and deprivation
adopted in the public administration and in the
social area, as a result of which the disposable
income of households decreased, and on top of that,
the solvency and creditworthiness of households
and enterprises adopted a critical aspect as a result
of general weakening of the real sector's possibilities
in the foreign and domestic markets. Deterioration
of the income situation of households endangers
repayment of outstanding loans, and, ultimately,
prudent operation of the banking sector, which the
SAO and the HFSA regularly referred to in their
reports in the past years. In the absence of sufficient
primary and secondary income ensured, increase in
the retail loan portfolio “favoured” the government,
as the declining standard of living was not so strik-
ing in the short term.
28 Structured Investment Vehicle (SIV), i.e. a special
purpose business organisation specifically founded
to restructure and transfer asset-backed bank loans.
During such transactions, securitised credits are
financed by short-term asset-backed commercial
papers (ABCP). A proven practice was that the bank
that sold its assets to a SIV in order to avoid liquidi-
ty problems provided the company with a credit line.
29 In the autumn of 2007, long queues of depositors
were lining up in front of Northern Rock bank in
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order to rescue their savings from the bank in crisis.
Coming from Central Eastern Europe, it was aston-
ishing for me to see worried people in front of a
bank with a national branch network in a developed
market economy in 2007, i.e. 12 years after similar
events involving the Hungarian Postabank. The
activities of the British government and supervision
have been harshly criticised since, and neglected
control of the lending processes is a permanent
issue in the Parliament. The British government
resolved the crisis management of Northern Rock
in an exemplary fashion, by temporarily – and rela-
tively rapidly – drawing it into state ownership, and
appointed a new management that reduced further
loss of confidence.
30 According to data by Bloomberg, the ratios of
banks and insurance companies in total write-offs
are 80 and 20 percent, respectively. 70 per cent of
write-offs took place in the United States, 25 per
cent in Europe and hardly 5 per cent in Asia. 
31 Erdõs, M. – Mérõ, K. (2008): The subprime crisis and
supervision of financial organisations, Hitelintézeti
Szemle, Vol. VII. No. 5, pp. 491-519
32 Publication of HFSA entitled “Risk Outlook”, 2008
33 The theoretical bases needed to calculate VaR were
laid down by Harry Markowitz (1952, 1987). He
used a periodical standard deviation of return as the
unit of measurement for VaR, and built his recom-
mendation on portfolio selection around it.
Consideration of the standard deviation in addition
to the expected return or the expected portfolio
value was seen again in the 1980s, when the
American Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) required a version of VaR to establish capital
adequacy of brokerage firms. Use and wide spread-
ing of VaR started in the early 1990s – at the time of
financial bankruptcies. In 1994, investment bank JP
Morgan launched its service called RiskMetrics,
which could constitute the basis of any VaR model.
In 1995, the Basel Committee accepted the require-
ment concerning banks' capital adequacy, which also
necessitated an approximate calculation of VaR. On
testing the systems of VaR, however, it was proved
that it can fail just when the information obtainable
from it is needed most, for example, in the event of
financial crises. At the time of the Russian state
bankruptcy in 1998, the hedge fund considered as
the largest at the time lost solvency within a week
despite a sophisticated VaR system of Long Term
Capital Management. The bankruptcy of LTCM
also pointed out that the extremely disadvantageous
change in the correlations may be accompanied by
full draining of the secondary market of instru-
ments previously considered to have acceptable liq-
uidity. The approach of VaR, nevertheless, proved
useful, because it helps bringing the risks assumed
by the financial institution to a common platform. 
34 The government approved its decree No. 153/2009.
(VII. 23.) on increasing the efficiency of consumer
protection in the financial sector in June 2009,
which assigns broader licences to HFSA. 
35 Finance Minister Timothy Geithner and FED
President Ben Bernanke agree on the establishment
of a new federal authority (Consumer Financial
Protection Agency, CFPA), but the debate con-
cerning its organisation is animated. The question is
whether it is to function as a new independent
authority or as a part of the FED. The concept of
CFPA also matches the broader reorganisation con-
cept of president B. Obama aimed at financial
supervision. B. Bernanke regards FED as the most
suitable to control the new supervision, considering
that the monitoring of financial risks and consumer
protection are closely related, and accordingly, com-
bined management of the two duties may yield fur-
ther benefits. Nevertheless, Republicans and
Democrats were equally reluctant to assign further
authorities to FED. According to their position, the
federal reserve system has already failed on super-
vising banks and high-risk mortgages. 
36 The current tasks of auditing are addressed as a pri-
ority in the studies by Lukács, János (2009), Fekete,
Imréné (2009), Boros, Judit – Rakó, Ágnes (2009),
Ladó, Judit (2009) in the professional journal of the
chamber entitled Számvitel – Adó – Könyvvizsgálat
(Accounting – Taxation – Audit). 
37 Veress, József (2007) addresses the global and
European losses of the Hungarian economic policy,
annulations of economic theories and the lack of a
marked definition of identity in depth. In the light
of these, Veress states that the European Union did
not know as early as before the crisis which
Hungarian strategy to face. 
38 Source of data: KSH jelenti, No. 2008/9-10,
Budapest 
39 J. M. Keynes's textbook (1965) is a collection of
theses on various economic policies with political
overtones. At the time of general weakening of the
system of planned economy in 1985, the then single
party organised a theoretical conference in
? STUDIES ?
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Kaposvár. The fundamental ideology adopted the
tenets of American economist Robert Heilbroner
on the general crisis of the capitalist production
method and on the business civilisation about to
crumble. In contrast to the crisis of the capitalism,
the system of planned economy formulated along
the state regulation was preferred. Presentations
held by my former professors, Kozma, Ferenc and
Kiss, Arthur referenced the possibilities of renewal
of the socialist planned economy, i.e. decreasing the
totalitarian nature of state intervention and more
liberal representation of market elements. For more
details on the subject, see Horváth, J. (1985), R.
Heilbroner (1994). Gáspár, T. – Varsádi, Zs. (2009) 
40 According to a letter written by leaders of the MNB
(National Bank of Hungary) and the PM (Finance
Ministry) to IMF CEO Strauss-Kahn on 4
November 2008, the government applies a strict
restrictive policy, where the primary objective is
financing capability of the country and reduced
deficit.
41 Báger, Gusztáv and Pulay, Gyula (2010) present
the peculiar transition of the Hungarian economy
to a market economy, with the adequate and rele-
vant finding stating that integration has taken
place but convergence of Hungary has been basi-
cally omitted.
42 Prompt Corrective Actions (PCA) – The system of
early intervention by supervisions was adopted in
the USA in the early 1990s, when a vast number of
banks went bankrupt. Adoption of the system in
America seemed to have achieved the desired effect,
after the number of bankruptcies of banks had fell
to one tenth, although the result was not exclusive-
ly owed to PCA, as the American business cycle and
M&A activities were surging in this period, which
added to the stability of the financial system. 
43 Capital Requirements Directives – CRD: A collec-
tive term for directives 2006/48/EC and
2006/49/EC that transferred the Basel II regulation
in the acquis communautaire.
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